The Irony of Deregulatory Takings by Rossi, Jim
Vanderbilt University Law School
Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications Faculty Scholarship
1998
The Irony of Deregulatory Takings
Jim Rossi
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/faculty-publications
Part of the Energy and Utilities Law Commons, and the Property Law and Real Estate Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more information, please contact
mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu.
Recommended Citation
Jim Rossi, The Irony of Deregulatory Takings, 77 Texas Law Review. 297 (1998)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/faculty-publications/987
Citation: 77 Tex. L. Rev.  297 1998-1999 
Content downloaded/printed from 
HeinOnline (http://heinonline.org)
Wed Jun 27 11:08:53 2012
-- Your use of this HeinOnline PDF indicates your acceptance
   of HeinOnline's Terms and Conditions of the license
   agreement available at http://heinonline.org/HOL/License
-- The search text of this PDF is generated from 
   uncorrected OCR text.
-- To obtain permission to use this article beyond the scope
   of your HeinOnline license, please use:
   https://www.copyright.com/ccc/basicSearch.do?  
   &operation=go&searchType=0   
   &lastSearch=simple&all=on&titleOrStdNo=0040-4411
Retrieved from DiscoverArchive, 
Vanderbilt University’s Institutional Repository 
This work was originally published as Jim Rossi, Book Review: The 
Irony of Deregulatory Takings, 77 Tex. L. Rev. 297 1998-1999
Book Review
The Irony of Deregulatory Takings
DEREGULATORY TAKINGS AND THE REGULATORY CONTRACT: THE
COMPETITIVE TRANSFORMATION OF NETWORK INDUSTRIES IN THE
UNITED STATES. By J. Gregory Sidakt and Daniel F. Spulber.*
Cambridge University Press, 1997. Pp. xx, 631."
Reviewed By Jim Rossi*
Laws change and, as they do, reliance interests are often affected.
For instance, if Congress or the Internal Revenue Service were to abolish
tax benefits for certain investment activities, this would undoubtedly affect
the revenues of individuals and corporations who have made investments-
perhaps who were induced by incentives in the law to make investments-
with expectations set under previous rules. Were Congress to modify
intellectual property laws, retracting or modifying currently protected copy-
rights or patents, it would wreak havoc on investors who have sunk
millions into new technologies, anticipating big payoffs from government-
protected monopolies in new inventions.
When, if ever, does a change in law warrant litigation against the
government? Of course, if the change stems from the action of an admini-
strative agency, extensive review of decisionmaking procedures is provided
under the Administrative Procedure Act.' Congress, though, can rarely
be sued for fault in its decisionmaking procedure, although one can point
' F.K. Weyerhaeuser Fellow in Law and Economics, American Enterprise Institute for Public
Policy Research; Senior Lecturer, Yale School of Management.
$ Thomas G. Ayers Professor of Energy Resource Management and Professor of Management
Strategy, J.L. Kellogg Graduate School of Management, Northwestern University.
, Hereinafter cited by page number only.
* Assistant Professor and Patricia A. Dore Professor of State Administrative Law, Florida State
University College of Law. LL.M., 1994, Yale Law School; J.D., 1991, University of Iowa College
of Law. Email: jrossi@law.fsu.edu. Thanks to Steven Bank, Fred Bosselman, Larry Garvin, Adam
Hirsch, and Mark Seidenfeld for their thoughtful comments on a draft.
I. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (1994).
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to classic instances when Congress has seen its actions reversed for denying
due process or infringing on other rights protected under the Constitution.
In Deregulatory Takings and the Regulatory Contract: The Competitive
Transformation of Network Industries in the United States, J. Gregory
Sidak and Daniel E Spulber seek to add more certainty to government reg-
ulation by arguing that government can be sued for breach of contract or
under the Takings Clause of the Constitution if it does not act to protect
expectations as it attempts to deregulate natural monopoly industries, such
as telecommunications and electricity. Since the early 1970s, liberal con-
sumer advocates have urged legislatures to use caution before deregulating
a variety of industries. Today, these advocates find allies in Sidak and
Spulber-hardly proregulation liberals-who see legal and policy impedi-
ments to government deregulation, but who invoke these to the benefit of
the firm and its investors. Sidak and Spulber's book is clearly written,
accessible, and timely, especially given the debate over deregulation that
has been brewing for nearly twenty years. It is also provocative and
controversial, as the micropolitics of the deregulation debate might suggest.
This review assesses Sidak and Spulber's argument in the context of
the case law and normative principles of regulation. Part I explains the
concept of a deregulatory taking, summarizing briefly the authors' argu-
ment and showing its practical importance to current policy issues in the
telecommunications and electricity industries. Part II argues that the case
law fails to provide solid support for the extreme argument for compensa-
tion advanced in Deregulatory Takings; although the law does not preclude
some deregulatory taking claims, successful claims will be far fewer than
Sidak and Spulber intimate. Part III addresses faults with the efficiency
argument for compensation. It suggests that the efficiency issue should not
be seen as one of unilateral risk of breach of a contract with the state, but
shared risk for regulatory change in the face of uncertainty; in such
circumstances, private markets are often in a better position to insure
against risks, and the turn to government for compensation has adverse
policy implications for utility regulation and law more generally.
At its core, the deregulatory takings argument is imbued with irony.
It reaches the opposite of the result one might expect: it relies on afaux
progressive notion of regulation-the regulatory compact, a shield pro-
tecting vested interests in regulation-while invoking a conservative's
2. Sidak is a fellow with the conservative American Enterprise Institute of Public Policy Research;
Spulber, a professor of management strategy at Northwestern University's J.L. Kellogg Graduate
School of Management, is one of the most prolific economists in the country, having written regularly
on the benefits of competition over regulation. See, e.g., Daniel F. Spulber, Retail Price and
Investment Competition, 28 RAND J. ECON. 207 (1997); Daniel F. Spulber, Market Making by Price-
Setting Firms, 63 REV. ECON. STUD. 559 (1996); Daniel F. Spulber, Open Access and the Evolution
of the U.S. Spot Market for Natural Gas, 37 J.L. & ECON. 477 (1994).
[Vol. 77:297
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artillery-the Takings Clause as a mechanism for insuring investor
confidence. I conclude by suggesting that Deregulatory Takings is not only
fraught with intellectual tension, but also overstates its case as a matter of
both law and economics in order to influence the policy debate to the
advantage of utilities and their investors. Perversely, however, were
utilities or investors to advance their legal arguments for compensation
prematurely and lose in the courts, such losses might make it more difficult
for them to obtain relief from the political process.
I. Sidak and Spulber's Deregulatory Takings Argument
Deregulatory Takings addresses how deregulation of network indus-
tries can reduce the economic value of private property and give rise to
government liability for breach of contract and as an unconstitutional
taking, requiring just compensation. The book pulls together and refines
a series of controversial arguments the authors previously put forward in
articles published in the New York University Law Review,3 the Columbia
Law Review,4 and the Yale Journal on Regulation.' In its simplest form,
Sidak and Spulber's deregulatory takings argument can be stated as
follows: Breach of the regulatory contract, brought about through the
elimination of entry barriers, may give rise to liability for breach of
contract or as a taking to the extent that there is a decline in a firm's
investment-backed expected revenues. The state is responsible for pro-
viding a regulatory mechanism to compensate for the full value of lost
expected revenues at the time the state makes a decision to deregulate.
As a building block for their argument, Sidak and Spulber advance an
account of regulation known as the "regulatory compact," according to
which regulated industries receive benefits in exchange for assuming
certain burdens. Although the terms "regulatory contract" and "regulatory
3. See J. Gregory Sidak & Daniel F. Spulber, Givings, Takings, and the Fallacy of Forward-
Looking Costs, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1068 (1997); J. Gregory Sidak & Daniel F. Spulber, Deregulatory
Takings and Breach of the Regulatory Contract, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 851 (1996). The controversial
nature of Sidak and Spulber's analysis is illustrated by the response it engendered when initially
published. Judge Stephen F. Williams of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, economist
Oliver E. Williamson, economist William J. Baumol, and Northwestern University law professor
Thomas W. Merrill responded in print to the New York University Law Review articles in the same
issues in which the articles initially appeared. See Stephen F. Williams, Deregulatory Takings and
Breach of the Regulatory Contract: A Comment, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1000 (1996); Oliver E.
Williamson, Deregulatory Takings and Breach of the Regulatory Contract: Some Precautions, 71
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1007 (1996); WilliamJ. Baumol &Thomas W. Merrill, Deregulatory Takings, Breach
ofthe Regulatory Contract, and the Telecommunications Act of1996, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1037 (1997).
4. See J. Gregory Sidak & Daniel F. Spulber, The Tragedy of the Telecommons: Government
Pricing of Unbundled Network Elements Under the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 97 COLUM. L.
REv. 1081 (1997).
5. See J. Gregory Sidak & Daniel F. Spulber, Deregulation and Managed Competition in Network
Industries, 15 YALE J. ON REG. 117 (1998).
1998]
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compact" may be relatively recent,6 the idea has roots in cases decided by
the Supreme Court between 1877 and 1927, and even earlier.7 The doc-
trine is recognized in classic opinions such as Charles River Bridge v.
Warren Bridge,' in which Justice John McLean stated in his concurrence,
[W]here the Legislature, with a view of advancing the public
interest by the construction of a bridge, a turnpike road, or any
other work of public utility, grants a charter, no reason is
perceived why such a charter should not be construed by the
same rule that governs contracts between individuals.9
Later opinions, such as Russell v. Sebastian,10 also endorsed the basic
notion that regulation is based on contractual principles. There, Justice
Hughes, in assessing a gas company's rights pursuant to the State of
California's modification of a municipal franchise, stated that "[t]he
company, by its investment, had irrevocably committed itself to the under-
taking and its acceptance of the offer of the right to lay its pipes, so far as
necessary to serve the municipality, was complete.""
Sidak and Spulber observe that, as a matter of economics, three com-
ponents are necessary to establish a regulatory compact: entry controls, rate
regulation, and utility service obligations.' 2 For example, traditional
telephone and electric utilities assume obligations to serve customers in
exchange for the grant of a monopoly franchise, protecting the utilities
against entry and guaranteeing recovery of their costs in rates. Because
under rate regulation government commissions have allowed utilities to
recover a return on prudently incurred capital costs in rates, utilities have
been encouraged to build capacity to meet customer demand. 3 Thus, to
6. See, e.g., Robert J. Michaels, Stranded Investment Surcharges:Inequitable and Inefficient, PUB.
UTIL. FORT., May 15, 1995, at 21.
7. Among the doctrine's supporters, the authors observe, were Chief Justice William Howard Taft
and Justices Stephen J. Field, Joseph R. Lamar, and George Sutherland. See p. 133 (citing IRSTON R.
BARNES, THE ECONOMICS OF PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION 14 & nn.43-46 (1948)). For further
analysis of the historical origins of the doctrine, see George L. Priest, The Origins of Utility Regulation
and the "Theories of Regulation "Debate, 36 J.L. & ECON. 289 (1993). See also Andrew P. Morriss,
Implications of Second-Best Theory for Administrative and Regulatory Law: A Case Study of Public
Utility Regulation, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 135, 184-88 (1998) (arguing that a contractual framework
can be used to explain past forms of utility regulation and to elucidate a second-best understanding of
utility regulation).
8. 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420 (1837).
9. Id. at 558 (McLean, J., concurring).
10. 233 U.S. 195 (1914).
11. Id. at 210; see also New York Elec. Lines Co. v. Empire City Subway Co., 235 U.S. 179,
193 (1914) (noting that franchise grants "are made and received with the understanding that the
recipient is protected by a contractual right from the moment the grant is accepted and during the
course of performance as contemplated").
12. See pp. 113-29.
13. See p. 120.
[Vol. 77:297
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the extent such a compact or contract exists with the state, the authors
argue that regulated utilities, unlike unregulated firms, have been induced
by government to invest their capital in order to meet their obligations. 4
Deregulation-particularly retail competition, currently under consid-
eration in many states-will (at the extreme) terminate or (perhaps more
modestly) cause a reassessment of this regulatory compact. The transition
to competition in historically regulated utility industries is not a Pareto
superior move. Clearly, deregulation will produce both winners and
losers. For example, with deregulation of electric utilities, some con-
sumers will see lower priced services while others may see increases in
rates.'5 The challenge regulators face is to make a transition to competi-
tion worth pursuing. This, of course, is what liberal consumer advocates
have long maintained with respect to deregulation in a variety of contexts,
such as the trucking, airline, and natural gas industries. Sidak and
Spulber, not progressive liberals, add an interesting twist to the debate by
suggesting that regulators should not concern themselves solely with the
consumer and social welfare impacts of deregulation. For the authors, the
wealth of the firm and its investors is of equal-if not superior-importance
in deciding whether to move forward with a regulatory change.
Consider, for example, competition in the electricity industry. Most
economists see overall efficiency gains from moving towards competition
in power generation markets, traditionally dominated by the staid public
utility. 6 However, as Sidak and Spulber convincingly argue, the transi-
tion to competition will burden some more than others. 7 For example,
in a competitive environment many formerly regulated utilities will still
own nondepreciated assets purchased with the expectations set under gov-
ernment regulation, and often approved explicitly by regulators in past rate
or need proceedings.
Microeconomic theory advises that, in the natural monopoly context,
regulators set price as close as possible to marginal cost, in order to mimic
14. See pp. 118-29.
15. Some predict that large industrial and residential customers will square off in a civil war in
the restructuring debate: large industrial customers hope to see almost immediate benefits, While small
residential customers may see increases in rates. See Peter Navarro, A Guidebook and Research
Agenda for Restructuring the Electricity Industry, 16 ENERGY L.J. 347, 348 (1995). Small residential
customers are especially likely to face rate increases if industrial customers are allowed to leave the
incumbent utility without paying some exit fee.
16. See, e.g., ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., DEP'T OF ENERGY, ELECTRICITY PRICES IN A COMPETITIVE
ENVIRONMENT: MARGINAL COST PRICING OF GENERATION SERVICES AND FINANCIAL STATUS OF
ELECTRIC UTILITIES, A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS THROUGH 2015 (1997) [hereinafter A PRELIMINARY
ANALYSIS]; PETER FOX-PENNER, ELECTRIC UTILITY RESTRUCTURING: A GUIDE TO THE COMPETITIVE
ERA (1997); PAUL L. JOSKOW & RICHARD SCHMALENSEE, MARKETS FOR POWER: AN ANALYSIS OF
ELECTRICAL UTILITY DEREGULATION 8 (1983).
17. See p. 8 ("[T]he transition from regulated monopoly to competition, like the transition from
dirty air to clean, is not free.").
1998]
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the results of a competitive market." To encourage firms to enter natural
monopoly markets and to provide for realities of rate regulation, however,
regulators routinely base rates on average costs.' 9 Regulated and competi-
tive markets would yield identical costs only if the average regulated price
of an asset equaled the marginal cost of duplicating that asset today. Due
to the divergence between average costs in regulated markets and marginal
costs in competitive markets for identical services, regulated firms may
own assets for which they have not received full compensation. To the
extent that these assets no longer generate adequate revenues to cover their
remaining capital costs-or are "stranded costs" 2 --Sidak and Spulber
argue that government bears a legal responsibility for compensation, as a
matter of both contract and constitutional law.2' In addition to developing
a legal argument to support government liability for deregulation, the
authors support their position with economic analysis, contributing to a
growing literature on the law and economics of networks.
In advancing their case for government compensation, Sidak and
Spulber present a mish-mash of legal and policy arguments for what should
constitute a deregulatory taking. Four conditions, they suggest, are
necessary and sufficient to establish a deregulatory taking: (1) the existence
of a regulatory compact, (2) evidence of investment-backed expectations,
(3) the elimination of regulatory entry barriers, and (4) a decline in the
regulated firm's expected revenues.' As a matter of economic policy,
they argue, compensation under such circumstances is warranted, because
it creates the appropriate incentives to encourage future investment.' In
so doing, they echo Frank Michelman's takings analysis, which suggests
that regulation should be undertaken without compensation only when the
18. See MARK SEIDENFELD, MICROECONOMIC PREDICATES TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 61-63(1996)
(noting that regulated industries are more efficient than monopolies but must set prices slightly higher
than the market price in order to encourage investment).
19. See id. (explaining that regulators must set price at average cost in order to encourage entrants
in the regulated industry); see also STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 15-16 (1982)
(stating that "where economies of scale render competition wasteful, the classical economist or regulator
will try to set price near incremental cost in order to induce the natural monopolist to expand its output
to a socially preferred level").
20. Although some might refer to these as stranded assets, this is a misnomer. In most cases, the
assets will not be retired completely due to deregulation but will continue to have at least some
economic value.
21. For other discussions of the merits of stranded cost recovery, see John Burritt McArthur, Cost
Responsibility orRegulatory Indulgencefor Electricity's Stranded Costs?, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 775, 914,
913-18 (1998) (proposing a system of stranded cost allocation based on "cost responsibility"); Leigh
H. Martin, Note, Deregulatory Takings: Stranded Investments and the Regulatory Compact in a
Deregulated Electric Utility Industry, 31 GA. L. REV. 1183, 1214-20 (1997) (providing a legal
framework within which a court could conclude that utility deregulation without stranded cost recovery
is an unconstitutional taking of property without just compensation).
22. See p. 450.
23. See pp. 215-16.
[V/ol. 77:297
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efficiency gains of regulation outweigh the lesser of demoralization costs-
measured in part by the adverse effects of the government decision on
incentives for future investments-and settlement costs-the costs of reach-
ing compensation settlements adequate to avoid demoralization costs.24
The breach of contract basis for compensation of utility investments,
Sidak and Spulber argue, finds some support in United States v. Winstar
Corp.,25 a Supreme Court case that the authors read to indicate "how the
Court would likely view a case involving recovery of stranded costs arising
from breach of the regulatory contract . "...,26 In Winstar, the Court
decided whether the United States was liable for breaching contracts the
Federal Home Loan Bank Board had signed with thrifts to encourage
healthy thrifts to merge with failing ones during the 1980s savings and loan
crisis. 7 The agreements allowed healthy thrifts to amortize supervisory
goodwill over a period of twenty-five to forty years, allowing these thrifts
an opportunity to recover the costs of supporting the sick thrifts. The
savings and loan crisis continued, though, and in 1989 Congress enacted
the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989
(FIRREA)Y' FIRREA prohibited thrifts from counting supervisory good-
will toward capital requirements, essentially voiding the contracts the Board
had signed.2 9 The thrifts sued and won a breach of contract claim against
the government.3" On appeal, the Supreme Court upheld the damages
award against the government, although the justices split on the rationales
for doing so.3 The case, according to Sidak and Spulber, illustrates how
24. See Frank 1. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical
Foundations of "Just Compensation"Law, 80 HARv. L. REV. 1165, 1214-15 (1967). In Michelman's
view, when a taking has occurred, "compensation is due whenever demoralization costs exceed
settlement costs, but not otherwise." Id. at 1215.
25. 518 U.S. 839 (1996).
26. P. 171.
27. Winstar, 518 U.S. at 843 ("The issue in this case is the enforceability of contracts between
the Government and participants in the regulated industry, to accord them particular regulatory
treatment in exchange for their assumption of liabilities that threatened to produce claims against the
Government as insurer.").
28. Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
29. See 12 U.S.C. § 1464(t)(9) (1994) (requiring "a savings association to maintain core capital
in an amount not less than 3 percent of the savings association's total assets"); 12 U.S.C. §
1464(t)(9)(A) (defining "core capital" to exclude "unidentifiable intangible assets"); see also Winstar,
518 U.S. at 857 (noting that the statute defines "core capital" to exclude "goodwill").
30. The thrifts sued and won summary judgment on the liability portion of a breach of contract
claim against the government in the United States Claims Court. See Winstar v. United States, 25 Cl.
Ct. 541 (1992); Statesman Say. Holding Corp. v. United States, 26 Cl. Ct. 904 (1992). This finding
of liability was affirmed on appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. See United
States v. Winstar, 64 F.3d 1531, 1551 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
31. In short, the plurality and concurring opinions disagree as to whether the government's
sovereign defenses were applicable to the disputed contract. See Winstar, 518 U.S. at 919-21 (Scalia,
J., concurring) (distinguishing his conclusions from those of the plurality opinion). Justice Souter wrote
the four-justice plurality opinion that held that the contract was enforceable because the government's
sovereign defenses were inapplicable. See id. at 871-910. Scalia's concurrence, joined by two other
HeinOnline  -- 77 Tex. L. Rev.  303 1998-1999
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government can be held liable, under the Tucker Act,32 for breach of
contract.33
Sidak and Spulber also advance the possibility of recovery under the
Takings Clause of the Constitution. The strongest case laying the founda-
tion for Sidak and Spulber's deregulatory takings argument is Northern
Pacific Railway v. North Dakota." There, the Court held unconstitutional
a North Dakota statute that set maximum rates on the interstate carriage of
coal, forcing two railroad companies to carry coal at an uncompensatory
rate. In reaching its decision, the Court reasoned that the state cannot
"appropriat[e]... property to public uses upon terms to which the carrier
had in no way agreed."35
Sidak and Spulber's argument also builds on the notion of regulatory
takings, a principle Justice Holmes may have anticipated when he famously
stated, "while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation
goes too far, it will be recognized as a taking."3 6  In Penn Central
Transportation Co. v. New York City,37 the Court explicitly recognized
a regulatory takings test. Under Penn Central, courts are to assess a
variety of factors in determining whether regulation constitutes a taking,
including "the character of the governmental action," its "economic
impact," and "the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct
investment-backed expectations. 39  As a matter of takings jurisprudence,
justices, argued that the defenses were applicable, but that the plaintiffs had made the requisite showing
necessary to rebut the defenses. See id. at 920-24 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
32. 24 Stat. 505 (1887) (codified in various sections of 28 U.S.C. (1994)).
33. See p. 198 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (1994); Winstar, 518 U.S. at 914-16). Under the
Tucker Act, Congress waived its sovereign immunity defense in contract actions. See 28 U.S.C. §
1491(a)(1). The Tucker Act does not apply to claims against states, which are largely responsible for
allowing competition in both retail electricity and local telephony. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (waiving only
United States sovereign immunity for specified types of claims); Brazos Elec. Power Coop., Inc. v.
United States, 144 F.3d 784, 787 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (noting that an element of Tucker Act claims is that
they are brought against the United States). As Sidak and Spulber observe, though, many states have
also waived sovereign immunity for claims in contract and tort. See p. 194.
34. 236 U.S. 585 (1915).
35. Id. at 598.
36. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). While many, such as Richard
Epstein, Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justice Scalia, read Mahon as one of the first regulatory takings
cases, one recent author argues that Holmes's opinion does not endorse-or necessarily provide an
intellectual precursor to-a strong regulatory takings test. See William Michael Treanor, Jam for
Justice Holmes: Reassessing the Significance of Mahon, 86 GEO. L.J. 813, 815 & n.8, 816 (1998)
(arguing that minimal scrutiny of economic legislation is the proper reading of Mahon, understood in
the context of Holmes's jurisprudence).
37. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
38. Id. at 124.
39. Id. For further discussion of the doctrine, see WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS
(1995). Fischel's book, advancing one of the more novel interpretations of regulatory takings, argues
that compensation for a regulatory taking should only occur for regulations by local governments of
property that is immovable or inelastic in supply. In defending this position, he argues that the political
HeinOnline  -- 77 Tex. L. Rev.  304 1998-1999
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Sidak and Spulber remind us that for breach of contract under the Tucker
Act, deregulation should be treated no differently than regulation. 4
Sidak and Spulber also argue that measures of just compensation
should mirror awards of damages given in the contractual setting-
specifically, the change to the firm's investment-backed expectations.4"
To give some rigor to this measurement in the deregulation context, the
authors, relying on the work of several economists,42 endorse in general
the efficient component-pricing rule (ECPR), which states that "the price
of an input should equal its average incremental cost, including all
pertinent incremental opportunity costs."43 Under the ECPR, "the
economic cost of the input to be sold by the incumbent [utility] to another
company is the [utility's] direct cost of making the input plus the
opportunity foregone by the [utility] from making the sale."'
The issues Sidak and Spulber address are critical for a variety of
network industries, and are the subject of pending litigation in the tele-
communications and electric utility industries.45 For example, electric
utilities have invested tens of billions of dollars in power plants to meet
their obligations to serve customers within their service territories. Once
retail competition is implemented, however, incumbent utilities will lose
their guarantee of recovery of the value of these assets through regulated
rates. Many electric utilities have already claimed significant stranded
costs, which are alleged to total as much as $200 billion for the entire
industry, exceeding the value of equity in electric utilities today.'
Sidak and Spulber develop a creative argument as to why recovery of
stranded costs may be justified. Although some states, such as California,
have allowed full recovery of stranded costs as a part of their state restruc-
turing plans, in other states, such as New Hampshire, deregulation of the
process can sufficiently constrain federal and state governments from excessive regulation, but that local
governments are more likely to overregulate immovable property or property that is inelastically
supplied. See id. at 288 ("If there is going to be any limit on regulation under the Takings Clause,
some limit on the scope of the desirable communitarian values embodied in local government
regulations must be established.").
40. See pp. 197-98.
41. See pp. 273-81.
42. See p. 286 (citing William J. Baumol, Some Subtle Issues in Railroad Regulation, 10 INT'L
J. TRANSP. ECON. 341 (1983); Robert D. Willig, The Theory of Network Access Pricing, in ISSUES IN
PUBLIC UTILrrY REGULATION (H.M. Trebing ed., 1979)); see also WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & J.
GREGORY SIDAK, TOWARD COMPETITION IN LOCAL TELEPHONY 94 (1994) (asserting that economic
efficiency requires a product's price to be no lower than its incremental costs combined with its
opportunity costs); William J. Baumol & J. Gregory Sidak, The Pricing of Inputs Sold to Competitors,
11 YALE J. ON REG. 171, 178 (1994) (stressing that the combination of opportunity costs and
incremental costs for a product must not be higher than the price of the product).
43. P. 286.
44. P. 320.
45. See infra notes 48, 81-82 and accompanying text.
46. See A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS, supra note 16, at 61; Eric Hirst & Lester Baxter, How
Stranded Will Electric Utilities Be?, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Feb. 15, 1995, at 30-32.
1998]
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industry has proceeded with less than full recovery.47 When regulators
provide less than full recovery of utility investment-backed expectations,
Sidak and Spulber's argument aids utilities in their battle to compel
compensation for federal and state regulators' reinvention of the regulatory
compact. For instance, the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission's
rejection of a competition transition charge intended to facilitate recovery
of stranded costs, proposed by a utility, PECO Energy, led the utility to
file takings challenges in federal and state court in January 1998.'
II. Taking Liberties With Takings Jurisprudence
Although Sidak and Spulber provide an extensive and historically
interesting discussion of legal doctrine, at times their legal analysis of
deregulatory takings is at odds with the case law, properly read. They
overstate the judicial support for their position, often ignoring arguments
that call into question their interpretation of the law. They also gloss over
several practical impediments to asserting claims for recovery of damages
for deregulatory takings.
A. The Weak Legal Foundations
Sidak and Spulber correctly observe the principle of the regulatory
compact in some of the cases, particularly those from the Gilded Age. In
addition, the potential impact of government action on the firm, as Sidak
and Spulber stress, is an important factor in assessing whether a taking has
occurred:49 as the Permian Basin Rate Cases"° observed, "'the power to
regulate is not a power to destroy.'... Many cases following the New
Deal, however, substantially limit the availability of recovery against the
government for takings claims brought by regulated utilities.
Most notably, in Market Street Railway v. Railroad Commission2 the
Supreme Court refused to require compensation where the government did
not authorize full recovery of the costs of obsolete technology-there, San
Francisco streetcars and bus lines valued by regulators at less than one-
third the amount at which rate base would have been valued using
47. See p. 9. Interestingly, in November 1998, California voters will consider an initiative to
effectively revoke its system for recovering stranded costs. See Allyson LaBorde, Learning the Hard
Way, WALL ST. J., Sept. 14, 1998, at R8.
48. See Steve Isser & Steven A. Mitnick, Enron's Battle with PECO:An Inside Viewfrom Outside
the Industry, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Mar. 1, 1998, at 38, 38-41. The case has since settled. See
Pennsylvania Settlement Will Open Market, ELECrRICrrY DAILY, May 1, 1998, at 1.
49. See pp. 240-41.
50. 390 U.S. 747 (1968).
51. Id. at 769 (quoting Stone v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 116 U.S. 307, 331 (1886)).
52. 324 U.S. 548 (1945).
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historical or reproduction costs.53  Since this case, courts have
consistently imposed on regulated firms the risk of changing technological
and economic circumstances.'
Sidak and Spulber's efforts at distinguishing key takings cases, such
as Market Street Railway, are flawed. The authors correctly emphasize that
Market Street Railway was concerned primarily with changing economic
and technological forces, not with an independent government decision to
impose a policy on industry. As Sidak and Spulber observe, the Court
itself had noted that by 1919 the Secretary of Commerce and Secretary of
Labor had advised President Wilson that the urban street railway industry
was "virtually bankrupt."55 But the authors greatly understate the extent
to which economic and technological forces have played a significant role
in making competition in the electricity and telecommunications industries
feasible.56
Sidak and Spulber also fail to recognize structural similarities between
the industry at issue in Market Street Railway and current industries under-
going restructuring. The authors argue that the major distinction between
the 1945 urban street railway industry and the current electricity industry
is that "today's electric power industry does not face steadily diminishing
demand for electricity and the looming obsolescence of its transmission and
distribution infrastructure."' Paradoxically, Sidak and Spulber do not
generalize to the industry level when addressiig the facts of Market Street
Railway. In the early- to mid-twentieth century, the transportation
industry, taken as a whole, was in a state of transition, much like today's
electric power and telecommunications industries; some transportation
sectors, such as street cars, were in a precarious economic state, while
other sectors, such as subways, railroads, and later, automobiles, were
undergoing periods of stability or growth." The analogy is a close one if
Sidak and Spulber's analysis of the facts of Market Street Railway is
53. Id. at 557, 564-65.
54. See infra notes 60-71 and accompanying text.
55. P. 258 (citing Market St. Ry., 324 U.S. at 565 n.8).
56. See JOSKOW & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 16, at 51-53, 86-88 (recounting improvements in
generation technology and their impact on industry structure). On how technology influenced the
growth of electric utility regulation, including the development of the franchise area, see HAROLD L.
PLATT, THE ELECTRIC CITY: ENERGY AND THE GROWTH OF THE CHICAGO AREA, 1880-1930, at 226-
34 (1991). On how technology-based controversies led the Federal Communications Commission to
begin addressing competition in local telephony, see Jim Chen, The Legal Process and Political
Economy of Telecommunications Reform, 97 COLUM. L. REv. 835, 843-48 (1997).
57. P. 258.
58. See INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMM'N, INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION ACTivmEs,
1887-1937, at 46 (1937) (describing prosperity in the interstate railway industry between 1920 and
1929); HERMAN MERTINS, JR., NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION POLICY IN TRANSITION 13-20 (1972)
(describing shifts in the transportation industry between 1920 and 1939).
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applied consistently to today's electric power industry: certain generation
resources, such as nuclear power, are obsolete,5 9 much as the urban street
railway infrastructure was at the time of the Court's opinion. Given the
strong analogies between the urban street railway industry then and today's
nuclear or single cycle coal-fired generation industry, the problems at issue
in Market Street Railway are structurally similar to restructuring in today's
electric power industry, despite the authors' claims to the contrary.
Nor do later cases support Sidak and Spulber's argument for manda-
tory compensation. In Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch6 the Court held that
the legislature's failure to allow a utility to recover $35 million for
canceled plants that regulators had previously deemed prudent was not a
taking, because the cancellation would only reduce the utility's annual reve-
nue by 0.5%.61 In reaching its conclusion, the Court focused on two
factors: (1) whether "slightly reduced rates jeopardize the financial
integrity of the companies, either by leaving them insufficient operating
capital or by impeding their ability to raise future capital";62 and (2)
whether "rates are inadequate to compensate current equity holders for the
risk associated with their investments under a modified prudent investment
scheme."63 As Duquesne illustrates, complete recovery of investments
induced by government is not constitutionally guaranteed. 4
Despite Penn Central's explicit recognition of a regulatory takings
doctrine,' later regulatory takings cases also do not compel compensation
in every instance where changes in regulation causing economic losses can
be asserted. For example, in Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co.,6' the Court
refused to find a taking based on the data-disclosure provisions of the
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act where there was no
explicit guarantee by the government of confidentiality and exclusive
59. See Bamaby J. Feder, Nation's Biggest Atomic Utility to Shut 2 Units, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16,
1998, at A1O (observing that many utilities are reducing operations at nuclear and coal-fired plants to
prepare for competition); Erik Gunn, CBS Corp.: British Company, Engineering Firm Buy
Westinghouse Units, CHI. TRIB., June 27, 1998, § 2, at 2 (noting that "nuclear power is becoming
obsolete" in the United States).
60. 488 U.S. 299 (1989).
61. Id. at 312.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. There are, of course, exceptions favoring utility recovery of investments. For example,
the D.C. Circuit has held that the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission was required to hear a
complaint alleging a taking in which the agency excluded from the rate base the unamortized portion
of a $397 million investment in an unfinished nuclear plant. See Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v.
Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 810 F.2d 1168, 1170, 1187-88 (D.C. Cir. 1987). But see Cook
Inlet Pipe Line Co. v. Alaska Public Utils. Comm'n, 836 P.2d 343,350 (Alaska 1992) (concluding that
no taking had occurred where a utility's rate base had been reduced 57% because the utility had failed
to demonstrate that the reduced rates affected the company's financial integrity).
65. See supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
66. 467 U.S. 986 (1984).
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use.67 In applying Penn Central, the Court reasoned that "[a] 'reasonable
investment-backed expectation' must be more than a 'unilateral expectation
or an abstract need.'"68 With respect to some data, however, which by
statute the EPA was prohibited from disclosing publicly, the Court
reasoned that Monsanto had a reasonable investment-backed expectation.69
Kaiser Aetna v. United States,7" a case in which the Court found a taking,
can be distinguished: there, the Court stressed that a physical invasion was
present due to the state's imposition of a navigational servitude on a
marina." For the most part, the deregulatory takings cases Sidak and
Spulber anticipate are not physical invasion cases.
In addition, after the Supreme Court's opinion in United States v.
Winstar Corp., the availability of breach of contract claims against the
government is much narrower in the regulated utility context than Sidak
and Spulber suggest. Winstar simply reaffirmed, by a five-to-four margin,
the traditional unmistakability doctrine-that promises by the government
to forego certain types of future regulatory action will be enforced by the
Court only if these are set forth in unmistakably unambiguous language,
which a plaintiff bears the burden of proving. 2 There is a presumption
that general language in statutes and regulations "'is not intended to create
private contractual or vested rights but merely declares a policy to be
pursued until the legislature shall ordain otherwise."'"7
Eastern Enterprises 1. Apfel,74 a case decided by the Supreme Court
in 1998, after the publication of Deregulatory Takings, further illustrates
the shakiness of Sidak and Spulber's suggestion that most justices on the
Court would endorse their argument. In Eastern Enterprises, the Court
addressed whether the Coal Industry Retiree Health Benefit Act,75 which
imposed liability on a mining company for its activities as far back as thirty
to fifty years ago to finance benefits for retired workers, violated the Due
67. Id. at 1005.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 1011.
70. 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
71. Id. at 180.
72. Although Justices Stevens, O'Connor, and Breyer joined in the portion of Justice Souter's
plurality opinion that recognizes a general exception to the unmistakability doctrine for government
indemnification agreements, see United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 871-87 (1996), five
justices rejected this exception. Justices Kennedy and Thomas joined in Justice Scalia's concurrence,
see id. at 920-24 (Scalia, J., concurring), and Justice Ginsburg joined Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissent,
see id. at 924-31 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
73. National R.R. Passenger v. Atchison, Topeka & Sante Fe Ry., 470 U.S. 451, 466 (1985)
(quoting Dodge v. Department of Educ., 302 U.S. 74, 79 (1937)).
74. 118 S. Ct. 2131 (1998).
75. Pub. L. No. 102-486. 106 Stat. 3036 (codified at 26 U.S.C. §§ 9701-9722 (1994)).
1998]
HeinOnline  -- 77 Tex. L. Rev.  309 1998-1999
Texas Law Review
Process and Takings Clauses.76  The plurality opinion, written by Justice
O'Connor and joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and
Thomas (who filed a separate concurrence), reasoned that the pension sta-
tute interfered with the company's reasonable investment-backed expecta-
tions and thus was a taking without just compensation. 7 The remaining
five justices, however, did not believe that the statute raised a takings
problem.78 Although the Court held the statute unconstitutional, only four
justices agreed that the statute violated the Takings Clause; Justice
Kennedy, joining the majority's result, held the statute unconstitutional on
due process retroactivity grounds.79
Ultimately, when one cuts through Sidak and Spulber's extensive but
selective description of the cases, one finds the authors suggesting some-
thing akin to a regulatory estoppel argument, precluding legislatures or
agencies from deregulating without full compensation for losses. Yet it is
well recognized that neither federal nor state law supports this strong
version of regulatory estoppel.' On the whole, the case law suggests a
much more modest notion of deregulatory takings than Sidak and Spulber
imply. Of course, deregulation can, in extreme situations, constitute a
taking. Under the case law, however, the state only has an obligation to
provide compensation after a firm has suffered and proved a loss to its
investment-backed expectations caused by an independent change in
government policy. In most cases, this will be extremely difficult for
utilities and investors to prove.
B. An Illustration of the Litigation Problem
This more modest understanding of deregulatory takings jurisprudence
may have some success in courts; but it is unlikely to compel compensation
76. Id. at 2137.
77. Id. at 2153. Justice Thomas's brief concurrence reasons that the Ex Post Facto Clause, as well
as the Takings Clause, should apply in this context. Id. at 2154 (Thomas, J., concurring).
78. Id. at 2161.
79. Id. at 2157.
80. Although no doctrine of estoppel applies to the legislature, a doctrine of regulatory estoppel
exists under which an agency may be estopped from violating its own laws. For a discussion of the
basic principles applicable to administrative agencies, see Peter Raven-Hansen, Regulatory Estoppel:
When Agencies Break Their Own "Laws," 64 TEXAS L. REV. 1, 5-9 (1985) (analyzing Supreme Court
cases that form the basis for the regulatory estoppel doctrine, which holds that agencies are bound to
follow their own rules because these rules have the force and effect of law), and Joshua I. Schwartz,
The Irresistable Force Meets the Immovable Object: Estoppel Remedies for an Agency's Violation of
Its Own Regulations or Other Misconduct, 44 ADMIN. L. REV. 656, 660-68 (1992) (observing that the
Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected equitable estoppel claims against administrative agencies, but
has not completely closed the door). Sidak and Spulber briefly discuss promissory estoppel as
applicable to regulatory agencies, see pp. 210-12, but do not address the case law behind, or specifics
of, the regulatory estoppel argument.
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in many-and certainly not most-contexts. Consider, for example, recent
litigation raising a takings challenge to deregulation policies for the electric
utility industry in Pennsylvania. PECO Energy, a utility, drafted a partial
settlement that would have established a competitive transition charge to
recover what it claimed were over $5 billion in stranded costs. The
Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission (PUC) rejected PECO's
compromise, which contained a mandated rate reduction, in large part
because it believed the utility was overreaching in its claim for stranded
costs. In the end, the Commission allowed recovery of some stranded
costs, but substantially less than the utility had sought." Although the
case has since settled,' the facts raise several difficult legal issues.
First, could PECO establish the existence of a regulatory compact?
Whether deregulation is a "taking" will depend upon a showing of a regu-
latory compact, a commitment on behalf of government to bear the bulk of
the risk of regulatory change. The evidence of such a commitment
proffered by PECO would include statutes, regulations, orders approving
plant construction projects, rate orders, and tariffs. In other words, PECO
would have to rely almost entirely on sources of public law to establish the
existence of a contract, but probably would not have an express govern-
ment statement-and certainly would not have unmistakably unambiguous
language in these sources of law-that government will protect industry
from regulatory change. Instead, as with most statements of law, some
ambiguity as to the future would likely be implicit. It is hardly going to
be easy for utilities to prove the existence of a government commitment,
which will be necessary to compel compensation under the deregulatory
takings jurisprudence Sidak and Spulber advocate.
Second, could PECO prove that the PUC's breach of the regulatory
compact is caitsally related to the damage it claims it suffered? Causation
complications arise, because endogenous changes in regulation are often the
result of-or at least occur simultaneously with-changing technological
and economic conditions, which Sidak and Spulber characterize as
exogenous. According to Sidak and Spulber,
Exogenous shocks are external effects such as fluctuations in market
demand, variations in the cost of labor, equipment, and technology,
and environmental factors such as the effects of weather on electric
power usage, or the effects of adverse weather conditions on the
81. See Isser & Mitnick, supra note 48, at 40 (noting that the "most important modification of the
stranded cost claim was the rejection of the company's calculation of the expected costs associated with
its generation assets").
82. See Pennsylvania Settlement Will Open Market, supra note 48, at I (observing that settlement
of the takings litigation gave PECO $1.4 million more in stranded cost recovery than the Commission
had allowed).
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operation of the utility's facilities. Endogenous shocks are
determined by the effects of the regulator's actions on the riskiness
of the utility's stream of earnings over time.3
Sidak and Spulber suggest that changes in economic and technological
conditions, as in Market Street Railway, do not necessarily warrant
compensation, but that independent government changes in regulation
do.8' Yet separating endogenous from exogenous factors is not a task that
a court will be able to perform easily. The task will be greatly complicated
to the extent that endogenous government regulation is a reaction to-or an
effort to mitigate-the very exogenous shocks that the authors claim do not
necessarily warrant compensation as a matter of law and policy.'
Third, and related to the causation issue, what is the damage that
PECO incurred? PECO followed the Commission's decision by taking a
$3.1 billion write-off, in anticipation of losses it claimed to be a result of
the Commission's decision. Yet PECO's common stock prices were
$22.93 a share before it filed its settlement, and $23.96 a share immedi-
ately after the Commission's decision. The day after the PUC's decision
and again later, Standard & Poor's affirmed its ratings of PECO. s
Several months later, PECO's stock had climbed to $30 a share.'
Assuming a taking can be established, damages will be extremely difficult,
if not impossible, to prove ex ante. While ripeness and finality require-
ments are satisfied as soon as regulators have adopted specific plans for
deregulation, it could take years for a taking to materialize for purposes of
measuring compensation.
Sidak and Spulber argue that efficient investment markets will immedi-
ately recognize losses due to deregulation."8 Two problems, however,
plague investment market data measures of damages. To begin, what today
83. Seep. 437.
84. See p. 494 ("To establish a deregulatory taking, it should be necessary and sufficient for a
regulated firm to show the existence of a regulated contract: evidence of investment-backed
expectations; the elimination of regulatory entry barriers; and a decline in the regulated firm's expected
revenues."). Sidak and Spulber attempt to distinguish local telecommunications and retail electric
competition from deregulation of railways, airlines, wholesale electricity, the long-distance telephone
industry, and the natural gas industry. In these latter industries, the authors claim, "regulators have
afforded the incumbent utility the opportunity to recover costs stranded by regulatory change rather than
exogenous declines in demand for the utility's services." Id.
85. In addition, it will be difficult to establish which economic losses can be attributed to
deregulation and which result from the existence of other laws. For example, regardless of whether
deregulation occurs, the sale of obsolete generation assets may lead utilities to take a big tax hit, to the
extent the tax basis of these assets has been completely depreciated. Thus, utilities may also suffer
some losses because of tax laws. For a discussion of causation in the context of takings jurisprudence,
see Jan G. Laitos, Takings and Causation, 5 WVim. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 359 (1997).
86. See Isser & Mitnick, supra note 48, at 41 (concluding from the bond markets' reaction to the
PUC decision that the decision was "not. . . a disaster" for the utility).
87. See Steve Forbes, One-Time Shock, Then Prosperity, FORBES, July 6, 1998, at 27-28.
88. See pp. 439-40.
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is considered obsolete technology may still have some substantial economic
value in a deregulated environment. For example, while "many predict
that nuclear power will not be able to compete in the increasingly
deregulated electricity market,"89 utilities that possess such assets have
engaged in serious negotiations aimed at selling them.' °  Not all
generation assets that utilities today claim as stranded by deregulation will
necessarily lack economic value in the competitive environment. Due to
loss aversion, the potential losses from changing the status quo are more
likely to influence investors than are uncertain gains. Uncertainty about
the future may lead investors to discount the benefits to the firm of a
competitive market.9"
A second problem that complicates the analysis relates to the proof of
damages. Aggregate, firm-wide financial data will be of little assistance
to regulators because deregulation will bring benefits to many utilities that
also claim losses. For example, many utilities that own inefficient or
obsolete generation facilities also will incur stranded benefits in a competi-
tive industry due to their valuable distribution and transmission systems,
including their rights of way. Without complete data, courts would be
foolish to compensate utility write-offs taken for strategic economic reasons
in the face of future uncertainty about the nature and degree of competition
in the industry. Strategic behavior by utilities may bias the information
regarding losses available to investors today, leading to exaggerations in
the costs of deregulation as measured by investor behavior data.'
Not surprisingly, the cases to date directly addressing the deregulatory
takings argument provide only cursory analysis in rejecting the claim. For
instance, a New York state court rejected several utilities' challenges to the
New York Public Service Commission's restructuring plan, observing that
the constitutional protections of "just and reasonable" 91 rates "do not
necessarily guarantee utilities net revenues nor do they immunize utilities
from the effects of competition."' Similarly, a Michigan appellate court,
addressing whether retail wheeling constitutes a taking without just
89. Jonathan Rabinovitz, Three Mile Island: Cleaned Up, andfor Sale, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 1998,
at Al.
90. See id. (describing GPU, Inc.'s negotiations with a potential buyer for nuclear generators,
including Three Mile Island Unit 1).
91. Studies suggest that "financially troubled firms, their shareholders, and their creditors show
loss-aversion and risk-seeking with respect to losses." Larry T. Garvin, Disproportionality and the
Law of Consequential Damages, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 339, 408-09 (1998).
92. Due to cognitive problems, firm-generated data regarding losses, once circulated, may be
overrated by investors. See id. at 399-400.
93. Federal Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 600, 603 (1944) (upholding
"just and reasonable" and "end result" tests against takings and nondelegation challenges).
94. Energy Ass'n v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 653 N.Y.S.2d 502, 514 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1996).
1998]
HeinOnline  -- 77 Tex. L. Rev.  313 1998-1999
Texas Law Review
compensation under a theory of per se physical invasion, rejected the
utilities' claims, relying on authority similar to the New York court's. 95
The only reported judicial decision to use the term "deregulatory
takings" is Gulf Power Co. v. United States.96 In Gulf Power the court
found a physical invasion of utility poles, which was mandated under the
Pole Attachment Act (as amended by the Telecommunications Act of
1996), 9 to be a per se taking, but held that the FCC, in the first instance,
is the appropriate institution to address the just compensation issue.98
This, though, is a per se physical invasion case; it does not address the
stranded cost issue posed by deregulation.
Despite Sidak and Spulber's claims, the case law does not overwhelm-
ingly support compensation in the context of utility industry restructuring.
Although the cases to date that address the deregulatory takings issue
provide little reasoning, the results they reach are probably correct. We
simply do not know the value of the loss until it is incurred, which
suggests that the wait-and-see approach of a more modest deregulatory
takings position is more tenable than Sidak and Spulber's position. Indeed,
this is the approach endorsed by the court in Gulf Power, which held that
a judicial determination of just compensation in the first instance is not
required upon each occasion of a taking of property.
III. The Policy Failures of Deregulatory 2kings
Sidak and Spulber's analysis of the efficiency of compensation, as
well as their formulation of pricing rules, also gives short shrift to some
of the important intellectual contributions of public choice theory and the
law and economics of risk and legal transitions. In the course of their
book, Sidak and Spulber argue that economic efficiency requires compen-
sation of all investment-backed expectations that are upset by deregulation.
This argument places the risk of endogenous regulatory change on
government, which in turn will likely pass this on to consumers, if the state
authorizes utility recovery of the costs of deregulation, or taxpayers, if the
costs of deregulation come out of the public fisc.
Their argument gives short shrift to one jurisprudential understanding
of the Takings Clause, which is reinforced by the law and economics
literature. The Takings Clause is commonly understood to be Lockean in
nature-a substantive safeguard protecting minority property interests
against the will of majorities-but it has also been described as a type of
95. See In re Retail Wheeling Tariffs, 575 N.W.2d 808, 815-16 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998) (arguing
that "reasonable interference" with a public utility's "equipment and services" is constitutional and
supported by Michigan law because the utility is a "regulated entity" whose "property is used for a
public purpose").
96. 998 F. Supp. 1386 (N.D. Fla. 1998).
97. Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996) (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 224 (Supp. H 1998)).
98. Id. at 1396-97.
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assurance against governmental action without careful consideration by
regulators of the social welfare implications of their actions. Because
lawmakers may be required to pay compensation if they effect a taking,
they are more likely to consider carefully the costs and benefits of regula-
tion prior to adopting laws-instead of responding to the naked rent seeking
of powerful, well-organized interest groups, who may seek to enhance their
own wealth at costs to the public.9 In other words, the Takings Clause
not only works to protect private property owners against burdens imposed
by the will of majorities; it can also work to improve the lawmaking pro-
cess in circumstances in which special interest groups are likely to use the
process to extract private benefits at significant costs to others.
This understanding of takings jurisprudence has some basis in the law
and economics literature, particularly public choice theory. As public
choice theory teaches, governmental decisions are often influenced by
regulated industry.'"l Oliver Williamson makes this observation in his
response to an early Sidak and Spulber article, to the extent he suggests
that inefficiencies resulting from opportunism in the regulatory process may
excuse some deregulatory takings.10' Industry may play an active role
in formulating regulation, or may willingly submit to regulation where
government has instituted mechanisms designed to compensate industry for
the burdens it imposes. For example, under rate regulation, utilities
themselves face incentives to assume service obligations independent of any
government mandate-even obligations to provide service below total
cost-because they are guaranteed recovery of the costs of service and
cross-subsidization of service may be facilitated through ratemaking.l 2
99. For the argument that, without takings limitations, government would regularly operate under
"fiscal illusion-systematic underestimation of costs-see Lawrence E. Blume & Daniel L. Rubinfeld,
Compensation for Takings: An Economic Analysis, 72 CAL. L. REV. 569, 621 (1984) and Lawrence
E. Blume et al., The Taking of Land: When Should Compensation Be Paid?, 99 Q.J. ECON. 71, 72
(1984).
100. See George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI.
3, 11 (1971) (suggesting that large industries will support complacent government representatives whose
offices are dependent on those industries). For a general survey of public choice theory, see DENNIS
C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE I1 (1989). For discussions of public choice theory in law, see DANIEL
A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION (1991) and
JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS & GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC CHOICE TO IMPROVE PUBLIC
LAW (1997). One renowned public choice theorist advises against allowing utilities stranded cost
recovery. See William A. Niskanen, A Case Against Both Stranded Cost Recovery and Mandatory
Access, REGULATION, Number 1, 1996, at 16, 16 (claiming that allowing utilities to recover their
stranded costs is an expansion of property rights because it requires the customers to pay to protect the
investors' value against changes in the market or technology); see also WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, JR.,
BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT (1971) (presenting a classic application of public
choice theory to bureaucracy).
101. See Williamson, supra note 3, at 1013-14.
102. For more discussion of these incentives, see Jim Rossi, The Common Law "Duty to Serve"
and Protection of Consumers in an Age of Competitive Retail Public Utility Restructuring, 51 VAND.
L. REV. (forthcoming 1998).
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If the strong deregulatory takings position were adopted as a legal
rule, it would likely have perverse implications for future legal and regula-
tory processes. A rule in favor of compensation based on lost expected
revenues creates incentives for private industry to seek out government
assistance in the regulatory process, regardless of the public good. In other
words, an industry might realize that, by entering into a compact with
government, the state can indemnify it against the risks of changing tech-
nology and new entrants. The result may be more government regulation
than is socially optimal.
Consider, for example, a phenomenon familiar to students of
regulation-the Averch-Johnson effect. 3 Economists have observed that
the traditional rate regulation process may have led to overinvestment in
capital, including power generation facilities, as utilities have strategically
sought to guarantee income streams."°  Under Sidak and Spulber's
analysis, once competition is introduced to a formerly rate-regulated
industry, such as telecommunications or electricity, government should
bear the responsibility for this overinvestment. To be sure, utilities
probably would not have invested in certain generation assets absent rate
recovery. At the same time, though, utilities have strategically used this
process to ensure revenue streams. To suggest that government bears the
entirety of the responsibility for overinvestment oversimplifies the dynamic
nature of the regulatory process.'°5
Because of the role of interest groups in the decisionmaking process,
adoption of some of Sidak and Spulber's legislative and regulatory propos-
als could recreate many of the same problems with ratemaking that brought
about the need for deregulation in the first place. As regulators attempt to
construct stranded cost surcharges, utilities will likely seek recovery of
many questionable and speculative items. For example, the very existence
of regulator-endorsed surcharges for stranded cost recovery could
encourage utilities to take write-offs and to exaggerate their risks, including
long-term contracts that could perhaps more efficiently be renegotiated in
light of increased industry competition."° Without a rigorous regulatory
system for determining surcharges-one which, like the rate regulation
process, scrutinizes carefully all proposed items of inclusion-Sidak and
103. See generally Harvey Averch & Leland L. Johnson, Behavior ofthe Firm Under Regulatory
Constraint, 52 AM. ECON. REv. 1052 (1962).
104. See JOSKOW & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 16, at 86 (summarizing the Averch-Johnson theory
that regulation has resulted in distorted levels of capital investment and excess capacity).
105. Cf. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Regulatory Treatment of Mistakes in Retrospect: Canceled
Plants and Excess Capacity, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 497, 506-07 (1984) (reasoning that the Averch-
Johnson effect should not justify utility recovery of wasteful investments).
106. See Michaels, supra note 6, at 21 (warning against rent seeking in the stranded cost
compensation process).
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Spulber's proposals for recovery have little basis in sound economic
theory.
For these reasons, the specific recovery mechanism Sidak and Spulber
embrace, the market-determined ECPR, may overstate the efficient level
of compensation in a competitive environment. The ECPR, as Sidak and
Spulber present it, entitles regulated utilities to the recovery of both
historical and opportunity costs. 7 Although Sidak and Spulber claim
that the ECPR will be set by the market, cost information will need to be
presented to regulators to ensure appropriate market oversight.' Claims
to recovery of historical costs, however, will be based on past investment
decisions made in the context of rate regulation. Under the case law, as
Market Street Railway illustrates, there is no guarantee of full recovery of
these historical costs. Further, to the extent that the past regulatory
process may have contributed to exaggeration of these costs (as public
choice theory would predict), these historical inefficiencies will continue
under the ECPR.11 As Oliver Williamson has observed, strategic invest-
ment concerns arise under the ECPR."
In addition to slighting some of the lessons of public choice theory,
Sidak and Spulber fail to fully address counterarguments from the law and
economics of risk. Because contracts governing all risks are costly to write
ex ante-a principle that Sidak and Spulber, who find liability based on a
regulatory contract, seem to play down-some mechanism for interpreting
risk bearing ex post, such as superior risk-bearer analysis, is
necessary.''
A risk analysis of the regulatory contract, it has been noted, should
consider two factors: first, "which party could best adapt to ensure against
the risk that a costly contingency would ensue" ;112 and second, "which
party could mitigate damages at least cost by changing the likelihood of
that contingency arising or the magnitude of costs due to breach of the
107. See p. 320. Sidak and Spulber note that the rule has been endorsed, in various forms, by
economists including Michael A. Crew, Jerry A. Hausman, Alfred E. Kahn, Paul R. Kleindorfer, Paul
W. MacAvoy, Janusz A. Ordover, John C. Panzar, and Robert D. Willig. See pp. 345-46.
108. See p. 368.
109. For criticism of the ECPR, see Nicholas Economides & Lawrence J. White, Access and
Interconnection Pricing: How Efficient is the "Efficient Component Pricing Rule?," 40 ANTITRUST
BULL. 557, 573-74 (1995) (arguing that if the ECPR is above marginal cost there will be an economic
distortion). For discussion of its limits and assumptions, see Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole,
Access Pricing and Competition, 38 EUR. ECON. REv. 1673, 1693-94 (1994) (noting that to be optimal
the ECPR must be subject to certain conditions, among them a benchmark pricing rule of marginal cost
pricing).
110. See Williamson, supra note 3, at 1019 (predicting that established monopolies will be in a
position to take disproportionate advantage of the ECPR relative to other firms).
111. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner & Andrew M. Rosenfield, Impossibility and Related Doctrines
in Contract Law: An Economic Analysis, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 83 (1977).
112. Timothy J. Brennan & James Boyd, Stranded Costs, Takings, and the Law and Economics
of Implicit Contracts, 11 J. REG. ECON. 41, 43 (1997).
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contract.""' With respect to each of these factors, there is reason to
believe that industry may be in the better position to bear the risks and
costs. For example, given uncertainty regarding the recovery of stranded
costs, many utilities have voluntarily sought to securitize the risks
associated with generation assets;1 4 with an expectation of takings
compensation, it is unlikely utilities would have voluntarily pursued such
innovative approaches towards the stranded cost issue. In addition, the
possibility of industry opportunism in the regulated environment gives
some efficiency basis for placing a portion of the risk of change on the
regulated industry. To suggest that government bear the entirety of the
risk is to ignore the comparative institutional advantages of government vis-
6-vis industry in taking actions to minimize the costs of legal transition.
Sidak and Spulber fail to pay sufficient attention to the contribution of
superior risk-bearer analysis to the deregulatory takings issue.
In assessing risk bearing in this context, regulators should consider not
only reliance interests and expectations, as Sidak and Spulber urge, but also
the relationship between risk and incentives. In his analysis of legal
transitions, Louis Kaplow observes, "anticipated ex post results-including
the effects of transitional relief-affect ex ante incentives. "1
5
Compensation may, public choice theory reminds us, create additional
incentives favoring government regulation regardless of whether this is
welfare enhancing. For this reason, the optimal compensation scheme
from an economic efficiency perspective may provide for only partial
indemnification of expectation or reliance losses from changes in
regulation." 6 The law and economics of transitions-a literature the
authors ignore completely-presents a much more nuanced approach to
these issues, one that generally disfavors compensation and which does not
113. Id.
114. Securitization entails setting up either a limited liability company of which the utility is the
sole member or a trust in which the utility owns all of the equity interest, which then issues securities
and covers the principal and interest with the collection of tariffs under a rate charge. This provides
a means to achieve a low financing cost from the higher rating assigned to the security. See M.
Douglas Dunn & Albert A. Pisa, The Stranded Cost Problem and the Securitization Solution, 12 NAT.
REsOURCES & ENV'T 248, 248 (1998) (arguing that securitization is an attractive opportunity for
utilities to mitigate the loss of unrecoverable or stranded costs); Walter R. Hall II, Securitization and
Stranded Cost Recovery, 18 ENERGY L.J. 363 (1997). For a skeptical analysis of securitization's
benefits, see Robert J. Michaels, Securitized Transition Costs: Rethinking Who Wins and Who Loses,
ELECTRICITY J., June 1998, at 58, 58 ("In reality though, the savings from securitization are small and
highly sensitive to financial forecasts, and the predatory elimination of competitors may be an inferior
use of the cash produced by the securities.").
115. Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARv. L. REV. 509, 527
(1986).
116. The argument is presented in more detail in Steven Shavell, Risk Sharing and Incentives in
the Principal and Agent Relationship, 10 BELL J. ECoN. 55, 59-60 (1979).
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attempt to ground the analysis, as do Sidak and Spulber, in the language
of rights and entitlements.' At a minimum, a comparative institutional
analysis of risk bearing and incentives would suggest some tempering of
the recommendations presented in Deregulatory Takings.
A further problem with Sidak and Spulber's argument is that, if it
were correct as a matter of law or policy, it would have few limits. The
argument can be used to find takings in a variety of licensing renewal or
modification contexts. For instance, in the hydropower relicensing context,
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's recent efforts to decommis-
sion hydroelectric projects could constitute a taking under their
analysis."' In the licensing and permitting context, their argument would
suggest an expansion of litigation against the government as it attempts to
modify the conditions under which licenses and permits are issued, regard-
less of whether this modification is implemented for deregulatory
purposes. 9
Line drawing, though, is a very serious problem for Sidak and
Spulber; it reveals the degree to which their deregulatory takings argument
tends to become its own reductio ad absurdum. If tax laws are changed,
why shouldn't individual and corporate investors be allowed to sue
Congress or the Internal Revenue Service for losses to their investment-
backed expectations? Why shouldn't the owner of rights to a book or a
web page be allowed to sue the government if intellectual property laws are
changed, altering their investment-backed expectations? The logic of
deregulatory takings, taken to an extreme, makes any legal transition a
very risky enterprise for government. It turns our notion of a modem
government, one which retains an experimental and flexible approach to
lawmaking, on its head.
117. See, e.g., Blume & Rubinfeld, supra note 99, at 579; Kaplow, supra note 115, at 615; see
also Jill E. Fisch, Retroactivity and Legal Change: An Equilibrium Approach, 110 HARV. L. REV.
1055, 1096 (1997) (discussing how insights of the new legal process school, particularly public choice
theory, hold promise for understanding retroactivity analysis in the context of legal transitions).
118. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission recently refused to relicense and, for the first
time in its history, ordered the decommissioning and removal of the 160-year-old Edwards Dam on the
Kemebec River in Maine. See Edwards Mfg. Co., 81 Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n Rep. (CCH)
61,255 (Nov. 25, 1997), order on reh'g, 82 Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n Rep. (CCH) 61,012 (Jan.
14, 1998); see also Michael A. Swiger et al., Paying for the Change: Can the FERC Force Dam
Decommissioning at Relicensing?, 17 ENERGY L.J. 163, 179-86 (1996) (arguing that an FERC
decommissioning may result in a compensable taking).
119. In this respect, their argument is eerily similar to the position of Richard Epstein. See
Richard A. Epstein, The Permit Power Meets the Constitution, 81 IOWA L. REV. 407, 419-22 (1995)
(arguing for rigorous enforcement of takings restrictions in the permitting process to protect individual
liberty).
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IV. Conclusion
Sidak and Spulber's argument in Deregulatory Takings harbors an
irreconcilable intellectual tension. Their reading of the law is at odds with
much of the Supreme Court's post-New Deal takings jurisprudence.
Throughout their analysis, Sidak and Spulber fuse a progressive under-
standing of the nature of regulation with a conservative reading of takings
jurisprudence that values reliance interests and demoralization costs over
incentives and risk reduction. In addition, the faux progressive under-
standing of regulation presented by Sidak and Spulber ignores much of the
post-World War II learning on public choice theory. The intellectual
tension behind their analysis makes it highly unlikely that their argument
will find support among a majority of justices on the Supreme Court, or
that it will appeal to a substantial number of lower court judges.
Were industry to advance Sidak and Spulber's argument prematurely
and lose, this adjudicative defeat could have unanticipated consequences in
the legislative and administrative spheres as utilities seek political relief.
The relative efficiency of compensation for past risk taking in a regulated
environment has large political and economic ramifications. But this is not
generally the kind of issue courts are likely to address successfully through
either the Takings Clause or an expansion of government liability for
breach of contract, especially when the political process has not fully run
its course. 20 Should industry press the deregulatory takings claim unsuc-
cessfully in court, industry may undermine appeals to the legislative pro-
cess for compensation. Indeed, it seems that in the political process the
fairness and equity arguments are most likely to generate a sympathetic
response from regulators. Given the legal impediments to establishing a
deregulatory taking, the industry and investors, as a matter of strategy,
might better first seek relief through the political process.
Despite their book's practical and intellectual faults, Sidak and Spulber
peddle their deregulatory takings argument at a propitious time. Regulation
is under attack in the United States and around the world. Deregulatory
Takings challenges us to reflect "hpon how regulation can transform itself
while also minimizing the costs associated with any transition. More
importantly, their book challenges us to think about how the costs of regu-
latory transformation should be allocated among stakeholders.
120. See Richard J. Pierce, Public Utility Regulatory Takings: Should the Judiciary Attempt to
Police the Political Institutions?, 77 GEO. L.J. 2031, 2033 (1989) (arguing that the courts should
refrain from ratemaking because the political process will produce the superior alternative of a
competitive market).
HeinOnline  -- 77 Tex. L. Rev.  320 1998-1999
